

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05 CIAE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

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GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, UK

SUBJ: WILSON VISIT IN RETROSPECT

1. SUMMARY. THE SOVIETS USED THE WILSON VISIT FEBRUARY 13-17 TO SHOW THAT BREZHNEV IS STILL THE BOSS, THAT DETENTE IS STILL ON TRACK, AND THAT SOVIET-UK RELATIONS HAVE TURNED A NEW PAGE. OUR BRITISH COLLEAGUES HERE ARE VERY PLEASED WITH THE VISIT, CONCEDED THAT THEY GOT A WINDFALL IN BREZHNEV'S RE-EMERGENCE BUT BELIEVING THERE WAS ALSO A STRONG SOVIET INTEREST IN ELEVATING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH BRITAIN. THE BRITISH MOVED TOWARD SOVIET WISHES ON THE CSCE THIRD STAGE, ON THE RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE, AND ON CYPRUS. IN RETURN THEY FEEL THEY GOT A SOVIET COMMITMENT TO LET BYGONES BY BYGONES IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND TO BRING BILATERAL TRADE MORE CLOSELY INTO BALANCE. THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT IS BASED ON OUR TALKS WITH MEMBERS OF THE UK DELEGATION AND THE BRITISH EMBASSY. END SUMMARY.

2. BILATERAL ASPECTS. PRESS COVERAGE OF THE WILSON VISIT HAS BEEN EQUALLED ONLY BY U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITS. NO MEDIA TREATMENT OF PREVIOUS SOVIET SUMMITS WITH OTHER WESTERN LEADERS HAS EVEN REMOTELY APPROACHED IT. THERE WAS A LARGE TURN-OUT OF POLITBURO MEMBERS AT BOTH LUNCHEES AND AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY (INCLUDING KGB CHIEF ANDROPOV IN HIS FIRST CONFIRMED SURFACING SINCE DEC 24). WHILE NO DOUBT MUCH OF THIS WAS DESIGNED TO PUT BREZHNEV BACK IN FULL VIEW, THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE FEELS THAT DETENTE AND BILATERAL CONSIDERATIONS ALSO PLAYED A ROLE. BREZHNEV HIMSELF, IN AN IZVESTIYA INTERVIEW FEBRUARY 17, SAID THAT THE TALKS WERE THE MOST EXTENSIVE IN THE LAST DECADE. KOSYGIN CALLED THE VISIT "HISTORIC" IN HIS LUNCHEON TOAST FEBRUARY 17 AND AGREED WITH WILSON'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE VISIT AS A "BREAKTHROUGH." THE BILATERAL PROTOCOL ON CONSULTATIONS SIGNED BY THE TWO LEADERS HAS SOME OF THE WEIGHTINESS OF THE DECLARATIONS OF PRINCIPLES WHICH BREZHNEV HAS SIGNED WITH THE U.S. AND FRANCE. THE LENGTHY COMMUNIQUE WAS GIVEN SOME EXTRA IMPORTANCE BY BEING CALLED A "JOINT STATEMENT."

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3. OTHER DOCUMENTS SIGNED -- THE TEXTS WERE ALSO PUBLISHED IN THE SOVIET PRESS -- INCLUDED A DECLARATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND AGREEMENTS ON ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION AND ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION. THESE WERE ALL AT BRITISH INITIATIVE, AND THE BRITISH SEEM PLEASED WITH HOW THEY CAME OUT. A MEDICAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED BUT NOT PUBLISHED. BRITISH THINKING BEHIND THE NPT DECLARATION

WAS TO GET A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES BEFORE THE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN THE SPRING. IN AN EFFORT TO SET UP INFORMAL BILATERAL CONTACTS OF THE KIND WHICH THE USA INSTITUTE MANAGES IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, THE BRITISH ACHIEVED SOVIET AGREEMENT TO AN ANGLO-SOVIET ROUND TABLE, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE EXCHANGES ORGANIZED BY THE ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND THE SOVIET INSTITUTE FOR WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (MEMO). DURING THE ENTIRE VISIT, INCIDENTALLY, THERE WAS APPARENTLY NO MENTION BY EITHER SIDE OF THE 1971 EXPULSION OF 105 SOVIETS.

4. ECONOMIC ASPECTS. THESE WILL BE COVERED MORE FULLY IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE. THE BRITISH ARE HEARTENED THAT IN THE COMMUNIQUE THEY EXTRACTED SOVIET AGREEMENT TO ACHIEVE A "BETTER BALANCE AND STRUCTURE OF TRADE OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS." THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO A \$2-1/2 BILLION CREDIT LINE OVER A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, AT AN INTEREST RATE (WE ARE TOLD) COMPARABLE TO WHAT WAS AGREED ON AT THE BREZHNEV-GISCARD SUMMIT. DURING THE TALKS KOSYGIN QUESTIONED THE BRITISH CLOSELY ON WHETHER THEY WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE EC; THE BRITISH CONCLUDE THAT THE SOVIETS FEEL CONTINUED BRITISH MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMON MARKET WILL MAKE THE UK MORE OF A FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH. WILSON GAVE AN EQUIVOCAL ANSWER TO THE QUESTION. DURING THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE EC, THE SOVIETS MADE ONLY ONE COMPLAINT: ABOUT TARIFF INCREASES AS A RESULT OF BRITISH ENTRY.

5. CSCE. WILSON HAD DECIDED BEFORE COMING TO GO AS FAR AS THE FRENCH ON CSCE. DURING THE TALKS THE SOVIETS PRESSED HARD FOR AN EARLY CONCLUSION AND, SOMEWHAT LESS HARD, FOR A THIRD STAGE SUMMIT. THE BRITISH REFUSED TO AGREE TO LANGUAGE SETTING A DATE FOR THE END OF STAGE TWO, ALTHOUGH WILSON SAID IN AN INTERVIEW WITH IZVESTIYA FEBRUARY 17 THAT HE HOPED FOR A SUMMIT THIS SUMMER. THE COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWS THE LANGUAGE OF THE SOVIET-FRENCH COMMUNIQUE IN EXPRESSING THE CONVICTION THAT

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"PREMISES EXIST FOR COMPLETING THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE AND FOR HOLDING ITS THIRD STAGE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN THE NEAR FUTURE." THE BRITISH REJECTED THE SOVIET SUGGESTION THAT THE LANGUAGE READ "ALL" PREMISES AND "NEAREST" FUTURE. IN THE TALKS THE SOVIETS WERE RIGID ON BASKET THREE AND CMB'S. FOLLOW-ON AND APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLES WERE APPARENTLY NOT DISCUSSED.

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6. MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIETS SHOWED NO DISPOSITION TO DISCUSS

THE MIDDLE EAST IN DETAIL DURING THE FIRST FEW MEETINGS AND IT WAS LEFT BY BREZHNEV FOR HIS TETE-A-TETE MEETING WITH WILSON FEBRUARY 17. OUR BRITISH EMBASSY SOURCES SAID THEY WERE NOT SURE WHETHER THE SUBJECT HAD INDEED COME UP IN THE 20 MINUTES THAT BREZHNEV SPENT ALONE WITH WILSON, BUT THEY HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT IT HAD NOT. GROMYKO PRESSED VLADIVOSTOK WORDING IN THE COMMUNIQUE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT TRIED "IMMEDIATLY" ON THE RECONVENING OF GENEVA; THE BRITISH ACCEPTED "AT A VERY EARLY DATE."

7. MBFR. THE BRITISH SUCCESSFULLY BEAT BACK A SOVIET DESIRED TO HAVE THE MBFR PORTION OF THE COMMUNIQUE REFER TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES. THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE SPOKE ONLY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF "UNDIMINISHED SECURITY."

8. CYPRUS. GROMYKO, DURING HIS TALKS WITH CALLAGHEN, ARGUED HARD FOR A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO MAKARIOS, AND THE BRITISH GAVE IN AT THE LAST MOMENT. THERE IS A SLIGHT DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH VERSIONS OF THE COMMUNIQUE LANGAGUE. THE ENGLISH VERSION SPEAKS OF RECONGITION OF "THE ONE LAWFUL GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS HEADED BY PRESIDENT MAKARIOS." THE RUSSIAN VERSION SAYS "ON CYPRUS"---THUS MORE DEFINITELY EXCLUDING THE LEGALITY OF ANY TURKISH-CYPRIOT STATE STRUCTURE. THE BRITISH ALSO HOPED TO HAVE THE COMMUNIQUE SAY THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS "CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE" THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT, BUT THE SOVIETS KNOCKED OUT THE WORDS "CONTINUE TO."

9. GERMAN QUESTIONS. THE SUBJECT OF BERLIN WAS NOT RAISED BY EITHER SIDE. BREZHNEV SAID THAT SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE IN CELEBRATION OF THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF THE WAR. THE BRITISH DID NOT PICK UP THE SUGGESTION, BUT DID AGREE--AS NOTED IN THE COMMUNIQUE--TO AN EXCHANGE OF VISITS BY ARMED FORCES REPRESENTATIVES.

10. UNITED STATES. THE SOVIETS SUGGESTED LANGUAGE REFERRING TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOVIET-U.S. AGREEMENTS, "ESPECIALLY" CONFIDENTIAL

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PNW THE TREATY ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WARFARE (PNW) AND SALT. THE BRITISH ACCEPTED THE REFERENCE BUT, BECAUSE OF THEIR RESERVATIONS ON PNW, CHANGED "ESPECIALLY" TO "INCLUDING."

11. LAW OF THE SEA. CALLAGHAN PROPOSED COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ON LOS. GROMYKO READILY AGREED, SAYING THAT LOS WAS A VERY IMPORTANT SUBJECT FOR THE USSR. THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE U.S. AND THE UK POSITON. HE WAS CRITICAL, HOWEVER, OF LDC DECLARATIONS OF ECONOMIC ZONES

AND EXTENSIONS OF TERRITORIAL WATERS; NONE OF THIS CRITICISM FOUND ITS WAY INTO THE COMMUNIQUE.

12. LDC'S AND ECONOMIC CONCERNS. THE BRITISH WANTED GENERAL DISCUSSION AND COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE NOTING THE TWO COUNTRIES' RESPONSIBILITY TO THE LDC'S AND UNDERLINING THE IMPORTANCE OF SOLVING FOOD, ENERGY, AND RAW MATERIAL PROBLEMS. THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE NONE OF THIS. BREZHNEV DISMISSED THE WHOLE AREA OF CONCERN BY SAYING THAT IT WAS NOT NEARLY SO IMPORTANT AS PEACE. AS A RESULT THE COMMUNIQUE CONTAINS VIRTUALLY NOTHING ON THESE SUBJECTS.

13. PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE. THE BRITISH ARE PLEASED WITH THE WAY THIS FORMULATION CAME OUT IN THE PROTOCOL ON CONSULTATIONS AND THE JOINT STATEMENT. THE LANGUAGE IN EFFECT DEFINES PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE IN TERMS OF COOPERATION, WITH NO MENTION OF IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE. THE BRITISH ARRIVED AT THE COOPERATIVE FORMULA BY LIFTING LANGUAGE FROM BREZHNEV'S FEBRUARY 14 LUNCH TOAST AND SELLING IT BACK TO THE SOVIETS. THEY WERE SURPRISED AND PLEASED WHEN THE SOVIETS ALSO BOUGHT THE BRITISH-SUGGESTED LANGUAGE "IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS"--WHICH THE BRITISH FEEL ADEQUATELY TAKES CARE OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE PROBLEM. THE BRITISH EXPECT TO TRY THE NEW PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE FORMULA OUT IN AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES.

14. RETURN VISIT. NO DATE WAS AGREED, OR APPARENTLY EVEN DISCUSSED, FOR BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO LONDON. THE BRITISH EMBASSY HERE SEEMS TO FEEL THAT THERE WILL BE A SOVIET INTEREST IN HAVING THE VISIT BEFORE THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS NEXT YEAR.

15. COMMENT. WE AGREE WITH THE ESTIMATE OF THE BRITISH  
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EMBASSY THAT THE WILSON VISIT PROVIDED THE SOVIETS A TIMELY OPPORTUNITY TO REINFORCE THE MOMENTUM OF DETENTE AND TO CHANGE A BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAD BEEN STRIKINGLY OUT OF LINE WITH OTHER EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIPS IN EUROPE. THE BRITISH EMBASSY FEELS THAT BREZHNEV COULD HAVE APPEARED IN PUBLIC BEFORE THE WILSON VISIT BUT THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED TO GIVE MAXIMUM PUBLICITY TO A "DETENTE EVENT," TO SHOW BREZHNEV TO WESTERNERS IN A SUSTAINED FOUR-DAY PERFORMANCE REFLECTING HIS GOOD HEALTH AND ENDURANCE, AND TO KEEP THE BRITISH ON TENTERHOOKS UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT IN ORDER TO EXTRACT WHAT ADVANTAGE THEY COULD FROM THE PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS. WE AGREE ALTHOUGH WE WOULD TEND TO ASCRIBE THE EXTRAORDINARY COVERAGE THE SOVIETS GAVE THE VISIT MORE TO BREZHNEV REASONS THAN TO BRITISH REASONS. IN ANY CASE, THE UK SEEMS SAFELY IN THE DETENTE FOLD AS FAR AS THE SOVIETS ARE CONCERNED, AND THAT IN ITSELF SHOULD SATISFY WILSON.  
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